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Introduction1
                                                     
1 This paper draws heavily on and builds on one element of an earlier report
published by RIRDC: Stoeckel,A (2005), Termites in the Basement: To free up trade
fix the WTO’s Foundations, RIRDC, Canberra.
As of July this year, the Doha Round of trade talks has been suspended.
Unless they are restarted there will be no multilateral liberalisation of
world agricultural trade or for manufacturers and services. This
disappointing outcome is despite the well-known result from scores of
studies that lower barriers to trade offers major economic gains to world
economies.
The proposition advanced in this paper is that the primary cause of the lack
of progress towards liberalisation, despite overwhelming evidence of the
benefits, is a failed process. It is a failure on two counts — the process
currently used to negotiate lower trade barriers is no longer working and
actually makes the going harder, and second, a process that could work
and has been demonstrated to do so, is not used.
The current process to try to lower trade barriers is a multilateral
negotiation based on reciprocity. While this process may have worked in
the past the underlying elements of previous successes have changed so it
is not working now. On top of that, reciprocity is logically flawed as an
economic concept. So, although reciprocity made political sense in the past,
things have changed and the economic flaw is now making liberalisation
harder.
The second process that could work, but is not widely used, except by
countries such as Australia, is transparency of policy. This transparency of
economic policy is more important since its application extends beyond just
trade policy. It applies to other areas of economic policy as well and is
therefore potentially more powerful as a process to generate welfare gains
from policy reform.
Since Australia is one of the few countries over the last few decades to
unilaterally reduce tariffs and other protection for industry, including
agriculture, and since it is also one of the few countries to engage a formal
process of transparency of policy, the experience is elaborated here. It is
this favourable experience with transparency in Australia as well as sound2
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logic that has underpinned a recent public initiative by The Tasman
Transparency Group to strengthen the WTO2.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the well-known analysis of
the gains from free trade in agriculture, as well as other goods and services
is restated. Although the case for free trade is well described in plenty of
studies, there are some conundrums that need to be addressed. For
example, if countries are going to protect industry, why choose agriculture?
And, if agriculture is to be protected, why do some countries protect their
farmers more than others? Also, in those countries protecting their farmers,
why do some agricultural industries receive vastly more support than
others? Finally, and most worrying of all, is why governments choose
market price support as the dominant form of support to farmers in
preference to direct government payments through the budget? Answering
these questions points to the main tenet of this paper: that the lack of
adequate transparency of policy through ‘due process’ explains the
persistence of protection for agriculture.
Next, the reciprocal multilateral bargaining process under the Doha round
of trade talks is described and why it may have worked in the past, but is
no longer working now. Indeed, it is argued that the current use of
reciprocity is making a successful outcome harder to achieve.
The final step in the argument is to highlight the political obstacles to
reform and how a systematic process of transparency can help overcome
these obstacles. Australia’s experience with transparency of policy is then
highlighted and advanced as a model that could potentially be repeated
elsewhere.
Free trade: why we don’t see it?
One of the most enduring features of mankind as Adam Smith wrote over
200 years ago, is that people trade. As Adam Smith expressed it ‘nobody
ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another
with another dog’.3 The point about trade and exchange is that it is
everywhere and occurs in millions of small exchanges everyday, all around
us.
                                                     
2 The Tasman Transparency Group, An Initiative to Strengthen the WTO, August
2006, www.nff.org.au.
3 Adam Smith, 1776, Wealth of Nations.TRANSPARENCY, POLICY PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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The trade between two individuals is no different to the trade between
Brisbane and Sydney and that is no different to the trade between Brisbane
and Tokyo. But somehow international trade is treated differently. And
somehow we treat one aspect of goods trade very differently from the rest,
namely agriculture. The biggest barriers to international goods trade are
found in agriculture. The best aggregate measure of the total transfers
made to agriculture is what we call the Producer Support Estimate
produced by the OECD. Chart 1 shows that there has been little change in
this measure since 1986 when the Uruguay Round of trade talks first
started. So-called ‘decoupled’ payments towards less-market distorting
supports has risen, but the change over nearly 20 years is marginal.
Agriculture has become the standout issue in trying to liberalise
international trade. So why is it that international trade is treated
differently from the trade between two individuals or two domestic cities?
Why is it that within the class of international goods, agricultural trade is
the most protected and why has there been the least amount of progress in
removing those barriers?
Answering these questions is pivotal to securing more liberalised trade. It
is no good proselytising on the necessity for countries to reduce their
protection for agriculture. That message has been given many times before.
Just saying that protectionist countries should do the right thing does not
lead them to that action.
A more fruitful line of investigation is the reasons why such protectionist
policies blatantly persist in the face of countless studies, including those by
1 Agricultural producer support total transfers to producers in high-






























Data source: World Bank 2006, Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda.4
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respected institutions such as the OECD, IMF and World Bank that show
enormous benefit from liberalised trade. Policy makers in the United States,
Japan, the European Union and others are all aware of the research
showing billions of dollars of gain to the world including developing
countries if they liberalise their agricultural trade. They have all read the
research or have been advised of the findings that millions will be lifted out
of poverty if trade could be liberalised. In the United States the official
advice to the President is that most farmers do not benefit from current
commodity programs and that less market-distorting supports could be
used.4 Yet the current betting is that the next US Farm Bill will be similar to
the current one.
India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, knows the value of free trade
and undertook some desperately needed economic reforms in the early
1990s as the Finance Minister. He knows what India should do. Yet India
remains one of the most highly protected economies. The United
Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair said that ‘Europe’s agricultural
protection is a policy born of another age and it is time to end it.’5 Yet
protection for Europe’s agriculture remains.
Most leaders, policymakers and negotiators know what should be done.
Yet protection remains. These leaders, negotiators and policymakers cannot
do the right thing because the domestic political situation will not allow it.
The trade protection problem is a political problem. Solving this political
problem, requires a political solution. The politics of protection has to
change. Analysing just what are the politics behind protection and their
roots provides the clues on how to change the politics.
What exactly is the political problem?
The political problem behind the difficulty in shifting protection has several
dimensions, each contributing to the impasse over the need to lower trade
barriers. Some common explanations for the political impasse when
scrutinised have little basis. These are now discussed.
Farmers are ‘special’
A common political excuse to persistent high protection is to argue farmers
are special. But how do you explain why New Zealand and Australian
                                                     
4 Council of Economic Advisors 2006, Report to the President, chapter 8, p. 173.
5 Prime Minister Tony Blair’s address to Australian Federal Parliament, Monday,
27 March 2006.TRANSPARENCY, POLICY PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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farmers receive little or no protection (chart 2)? And how do you explain
why in, say, the United States, some farmers like beef producers receive
virtually no protection, but others in cropping or in sugar receive plenty
(chart 3)?
New Zealand and Australia reduced their support for their farmers for the
same reason: that the country would be better of without giving the
subsidies. But the political stimulus for reform in each was different. In
New Zealand’s case, a severe economic crisis at home simply meant the
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country could not afford the subsidies it was paying its farmers and other
industry. Farm protection was removed virtually overnight6.
In Australia’s case, there was no severe economic crisis but rather a long
period of lack-lustre performance. A change of government ushered in a
new set of institutional arrangements that led to a process of domestic
transparency of policy.
The systematic and repeated assessment of all of Australia’s protection
arrangements across all industry saw protection removed, initially for
agriculture and manufacturing but later service industries as well. Finally,
all output and the factor markets of labour and capital were deregulated, a
good synopsis of which is contained in Banks (2005). The transparency
process, Australian-style, is developed and expanded later, but the point
for now is that the review process introduced, whether by luck or good
design, saw protection for Australian farmers substantially reduced.
Farmers are not that ‘special’ so other political explanations for resistance
to liberalisation need to be found.
Xenophobia and mercantilism
Xenophobia — the fear of foreign things — is another explanation for
difficult politics behind protection. It is the only explanation for why
international trade is treated differently than domestic trade. There is no
difference between international and domestic trade it is just a labelling
issue. People have a natural fear of foreign things. Politicians play on this
fear and appeal to nationalist sentiment to win popularity. They directly or
indirectly paint foreign products or services and foreigners themselves as
the bogeymen and the reason for job losses or any other ills. But people are
simply ‘shooting themselves in the foot’ by denying themselves access to
the best value-for-money goods and services in the world. Keeping foreign
goods out hurts the locals far more than it hurts the foreigner.
The major misunderstanding here has its roots in mercantilism — that the
aim of trade is to accumulate treasure or in modern day terms that exports
are good but imports are bad. Yet the purpose of all economic activity is to
consume. Imports are the good things that enhance welfare. Exports are
good too, but only because they are needed to earn the foreign exchange to
pay for those valuable welfare-enhancing imports.
                                                     
6 A good account of the experience is given by Federated Farmers of New Zealand:
Life without subsidies.TRANSPARENCY, POLICY PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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We know there is a major misunderstanding in this ‘exports good, imports
bad’ doctrine because in practically every department of trade in the world
you will find export promotion authorities and incentive programs to
exporters. Nowhere will you find import promotion authorities. Yet the
most successful exporters in the world are also the most successful
importers. The cruel irony is that those protectionist countries wanting to
export more are actually penalising their own exports by stopping imports.
Mercantilism and reciprocity
Related to the issue of mercantilism is reciprocity, a basic principle of the
WTO system. It is a mechanism used in multilateral trade negotiations to
either liberalise markets or agree to new or changed rules.
Reciprocity is a bargaining tool. At its simplest level, it may involve a tariff
reduction for a good like steel in exchange for another country’s offer to
reduce tariffs on, say, textiles. But the bargain can be for anything of
perceived value to a WTO member, including non-trade concerns, and
need not be simultaneous in time.7
Reciprocity has three advantages. First, it changes the political dynamic,
facilitating liberalisation. A second advantage is its basic appeal to
‘fairness’ — every member is seen to be contributing to liberalisation. The
third advantage is that the reciprocity mechanism can overcome the ‘free-
rider’ problem, which is inherent in any multilateral trade negotiation
because of the unconditional MFN principle. Despite these advantages,
reciprocity also has some drawbacks that are now holding the cause of
trade liberalisation back.
The first advantage of reciprocity, that it changes the political dynamic of
liberalisation, warrants expanding. Protection against imports persists
because those who stand to gain from preventing imports into a country
form effective lobby groups arguing for its retention. They point to the
extra activity and jobs in their industry that protection creates. That is true
for their industry. Unfortunately, all too often politicians and the public go
along with this simple argument, believing ‘imports cost jobs’. This belief
looks obvious, but turns out to be wrong.
Just why this belief is wrong is well known to economists. The mistake is
that the argument ignores the second round effects on other industries
                                                     
7 Bhagwati highlights several typologies that can be used to classify reciprocity —
for example, whether it is ‘simultaneous’ or ‘sequential’, or ‘within trade’ or
‘outside trade’ in Bhagwati, J. 2002, Going Alone: The Case for Relaxed Reciprocity in
Freeing Trade, MIT Press, London, p. 10.8
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where the burden of protection causes less activity and jobs to be lost. For
now it is sufficient to note, whatever the reason, real or imaginary, that
negotiators believe that, during multilateral trade negotiations, they are
offering up a ‘concession’ in exchange for access (or something else of
value) to another country’s market. By tying the access to another country’s
markets (which, correctly, is of benefit) in exchange for removing a tariff on
imports at home (the ‘concession’), powerful political forces are brought
into play. The interests of exporters who stand to gain from the negotiation
are pitted against the interests of producers in import-protected industries
who resist liberalisation. The ‘jobs will be lost’ argument made by locally
protected producers is offset by the local exporters’ argument that ‘jobs will
be created’.
Reciprocity therefore changes the political balance and makes liberalisation
more politically possible. An added bonus is that if everyone liberalises
across all industries together, the gains are greater and the adjustment costs
smaller.
But, reciprocity is not working now as a major force for trade liberalisation,
including for agriculture, for two reasons. One is that reciprocity is a
dangerous political game because it sends out the wrong message about
trade liberalisation. The other reason is that the political forces that could
be brought into play to help secure liberalisation are now much weaker. No
natural export constituency currently exists in the European Union or the
United States to argue against the interests of the farmers who receive so
much protection. Without these constituencies arguing for reform,
politicians are not going to argue the case for reform.
That reciprocity makes good politics, but lousy economics, has been well
known for some time. As put simply in the study by Viravan and others in
the late eighties, ‘the emphasis on reciprocity misinforms and mis-educates
everyone (including trade officials) about the basic argument for liberal
trade’.8 The problem is that reciprocity sets up a game scored by
mercantilist rules: an increase in exports is a victory, but an increase in
imports is a defeat.9 Reciprocity fuels the ‘exports good, imports bad’,
message that is dead wrong. If the public wrongly believes imports are bad,
politicians will find it that much harder to liberalise trade.
                                                     
8 Viravan, A., 1987, Trade Routes to Sustained Economic Growth: Report of a Study
Group of the Trade Policy Research Group, MacMillan Press for the United Nations,
London, p. 136.
9 Krugman P. 1997, ‘What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, Journal of
Economic Liberature, vol. XXXV, March, pp. 113–20.TRANSPARENCY, POLICY PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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Why is the ‘imports bad’ message wrong? Quite apart from the simple
math that no one could export if there were no imports, the ‘imports bad’
message ignores basic economics and the basis for trade10.
Imports add to welfare because they allow a country to concentrate on
what it does best. Exports are a good thing, but only because they allow a
country to earn the foreign exchange with which to purchase imports.
Indeed, should a country stop all imports, eventually all exports would
stop too — so an import tax (barrier) simply ends up being a hidden export
tax.
Playing clever politics around an economically flawed concept may have
worked in the past, but it is now setting the cause of free trade backwards.
That drawback is exacerbated by reciprocity’s second weakness — that it
has outlived its usefulness. This was recognised as a potential problem
before the Uruguay Round got under way, and it is even more apparent
now.11
However economically flawed the concept, if reciprocity is to work, it must
pit some interest groups within the European Union, the United States or
Japan against their farmers receiving protection. But there is little else left
for others to liberalise from the European Union’s and the United State’s
points of view — the simple average tariff on industrial products in the
United States is 4.7 per cent. In the Europe Union it is 4.5 per cent.
Although tariffs are higher in developing countries, these are not major
markets for Europe or the United States.
Relying on reciprocity now to secure liberalisation of agriculture is not
likely to work because it cannot bring strong enough political forces into
play and the lousy economics it implies has mis-educated a wide public
and is making the going harder.
Narrow vested interest groups
A common explanation for the lack of trade reform (or other costly policies
for that matter) is that the beneficiaries of reform are widely dispersed and
unorganised, but the gainers from protection are concentrated to a few and
these people are highly organised and lobby hard for protection. The
                                                     
10 The Tasman Transparency Group makes this point eloquently as well. Countries
can only take from the negotiating table what they are prepared to take to the
table. The so far failure of the Doha talks is that countries have not made good
offers, and that is due to a lack of good domestic processes to ascertain what is in
a county’s own interests.
11 Viravan 1987, p. 137.10
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widely dispersed beneficiaries from liberalising trade are also not fully
informed on the gains from change since it does not pay them to be so
informed. The political bias is therefore for no change.
The argument looks appealing but it is wrong in fact. Look to the
Australian case again. In Australia, the car and textile industries received
high levels of protection from a high level of tariff support12. The two
industries lobbied hard and for a long time won the retention of their
protection. The beneficiaries of reform were widely dispersed throughout
the economy, the consumers and other industries using cars and textiles as
inputs.  It ‘fits the bill’ perfectly for an explanation of the lack of reform. So
what happened to cause Australia to unilaterally reduce its support for its
highly protected industries? It was the systematic and repeated
economywide analysis of the policies of protection through an
independent, open process of transparency. These two elements were
sufficient to change the politics of protection in Australia to the great
economic benefit of the nation. These two essential ingredients of policy
reform are now explained.
One key: economywide analysis
The fundamental reason for wrong policy, which cannot be emphasised
strongly enough, is that the secondary consequences of policy actions are
overlooked. Mostly, only the first round immediate effects are considered
— usually the costs impacting on the special interest group pleading for the
policy. Hazlitt, in his book Economics in One Lesson, claims ‘nine-tenths of
the economic fallacies that are working such dreadful harm in the world
today are the result of ignoring this lesson [of looking at secondary
consequences]’.13 Protectionist trade policy falls into this category and
Hazlitt devotes a chapter to that topic. Although that claim was made years
ago, the same conclusion would stand today. Looking at ‘secondary
consequences’ is just another way of saying ‘economywide analysis’ that
looks at the benefits as well as the costs of policy. But the failure to measure
the benefits as well as the costs is, in some cases, even worse than mere
oversight — it is deliberate. In anti-dumping cases, for example, the law in
practically every country in the world precludes the ‘unseen’ secondary
effects (the benefits for consumers) from being measured.
Economywide analysis entails consideration of all linkages and secondary
effects in a sector protected through a policy. It involves looking at both the
                                                     
12  See CIE One shoe per Person for a brief history of the policy and its cost.
13 Hazlitt, H. 1979, Economics In One Lesson, Three Rivers Press, New York.TRANSPARENCY, POLICY PROCESSES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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benefits and costs of the policy. There are several ways this can be done.
One early technique was to measure the effective rate of protection. In this
method the penalties on an industry as a result of protection elsewhere in the
economy are considered along with the benefits the protected industry
receives. Today, with advances in computing techniques, economywide
analysis using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models is routinely
undertaken by researchers.
Another key: proper process
Economywide analysis on its own is not sufficient to educate the public
and policymakers of the harm caused by restrictive trade policies and shift
the politics. Proper process i s  a l s o  r e q u i r e d .  I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n d u c t
economywide analysis openly by an independent agency so each
stakeholder can see and comment on the other stakeholders’ submissions.
And this information must be formally injected into the government’s
decision making. So, for example, protected sugar farmers in the United
States would be able to comment on the greens’ input to any inquiry into
sugar subsidies on their concerns for the damage the protection causes the
Everglades in Florida14, to ensure that exaggerated claims are not made
and vice-versa. A draft report by the independent agency should then be
produced, and made available for written comment by all concerned.15
Through this process, those who benefit and those who bear the burden of
the policy are identified. There will be a natural coalescing of those losing
from the policy to lobby the government for change. That is, an open,
independent process of economywide analysis changes the politics of protection16.
Protection is, after all, a political game. The suspended Doha negotiations
are no exception. Economywide analysis makes economic sense and, when
conducted through an open, transparent and independent process, makes
political sense as well. When conducted in this manner, the politics for
reform is also ultimately more powerful. With correct analysis,
policymakers and the public will become better educated about the
                                                     
14  Humphreys, J., van Bueren, M. and Stoeckel, A. 2003, Greening Farm Subsidies:
The Next Step in Removing Perverse Farm Subsidies, RIRDC Publication No. 03/040,
Canberra.
15 Specifically, the process of review has to involve a terms of reference issued to
the independent reviewing agency, which then puts out an issues paper setting
out the review framework and identifying key stakeholders. The agency calls for
submissions and holds public hearings (anyone can see and comment on any
other submission), and produces a draft report. Comments on the draft report,
also in the public domain, are considered and incorporated as required, and a
final report produced, which must be considered by government.
16  Stoeckel Termites in the basement12
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economics of trade protection. This changes the mindset of those reviewing
claims for assistance and becomes built into government internal processes.
The politics of protection changes with this education, making it harder for
narrow vested interests to dominate the national interest.
There must be something to informing the public about the costs of
protection because there is one last uncomfortable fact: why do
governments choose hidden mechanisms to give the bulk of support to
farmers? Chart 4 shows that the bulk of assistance that’s offered to farmers
is mostly though market price support — it is mostly due to barriers at the
border. Governments could give all the assistance via domestic support
through the annual budget. Yet they choose not to and reducing market
support for agriculture has been one of the main sticking points in the
Doha negotiations.
The reason why direct payments are not used is that they would be up for
annual scrutiny through the annual budget of the government. That
implies two things: the policies owe their existence on deception, which is
not much of a basis for policy, and the solution is clear, expose them.
Concluding comments
The reviews of Australia’s import protection through the 1970’s and
beyond conducted through an independent, open and transparent process
of economywide analysis highlights two things: it takes time and other
competing lobby groups are brought into the political equation. Initially,
the politics of protection proved hard to shift. The carmakers and textile
manufacturers fought hard to retain their high levels of tariff protection.
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With time, however, the politics changed. It became apparent that
Australia’s miners and farmers, the two main export groups, were bearing
the burden of protection. They joined forces to form a coalition for reform
that the government could not politically resist. Australia then embarked
on a path of unilateral liberalisation to the benefit of the economy.17
Although pockets of low protection still remain, Australia is one of the
relatively open economies of the world today.
The reduction in protection in Australia was the result of an open,
independent process of systematic and repeated economywide analysis of
protection. Critically, the mindset of enough people in Australia had
changed and enough industry groups involved in the debate to swing the
politics in favour of liberalisation. Narrow, selfish, vested interests still
exist; they always will. But, with few notable exceptions, mostly the
economic debate reported in Australia’s responsible media highlights the
secondary benefits of policy choices, portraying a balanced view of the
costs and benefits of issues.
If systematically considering the secondary or economywide effects of
trade policies through an open and independent review is this important, it
is astounding that such analyses are rare. Yes, there are plenty of analyses,
such as those by the World Bank18, of the economywide effects of trade
policies, but studies conducted in conjunction with good governance
processes are few and far between. Moreover, this transparency has to
occur within domestic capitals, not an international organisation.
Countries, such as Australia, choosing to routinely subject trade policy at
home to this combination of analysis and due process have seen significant
unilateral liberalisation of trade to the benefit of the country. That is why
the Tasman Transparency Group has launched its initiative for formal
transparency to occur in domestic capitals around the world through
coordination in the WTO.
                                                     
17 A good account of Australia’s experience is by Banks, G. 2003, ‘Gaining from
trade liberalisation: some reflections on Australia’s experience’, Presentation to
the IBBE&L/CEDA Conference, ‘New Horizons in Trade: The WTO Round and
Australia’s Free Trade Negotiations’, Adelaide Convention Centre, 5 June.
18 See for example, Anderson, K. and Martin (eds), W. 2006, Agricultural Trade
Reform & the Doha Round, World Bank, Washington DC.TheCIE.com.au
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Transparency Australian style:
Lessons for Doha?
 Doha talks ‘suspended’
 Primary cause is a failed process
– Reciprocity no longer working
– Transparency not used
 Few countries engage proper transparency 
processes
– Has worked in Australia
– Could it work elsewhere?3
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Why so little change?
 Know what to do
 Yet protection remains
 Political problem
– Requires a political solution















































Average level of producer support by commodity in the United States7
Xenophobia and mercantilism
 International trade treated differently from 
domestic trade
– Many examples here
 Modern mercantilism
– “Exports good, imports bad”8
Mercantilism and reciprocity
 WTO negotiations based on reciprocity
 Reciprocity has three advantages
– Changes domestic political dynamics
– Appeals to ‘fairness’
– Helps prevent free rider problem
 But concept flawed economically
– ‘Concessions’ implies imports ‘bad’
 Reciprocity no longer working9
Narrow vested interests
 Recipients concentrated (and organised) but 
beneficiaries widely dispersed (and 
unorganised)
 But then why did Australia unilaterally reduce 
car and textile tariffs?
 Systematic program of transparency the key
– Economy-wide analysis one ingredient
– ‘Due process’ the other10
First key: economywide
 Secondary consequences of policy seldom 
measured
 Cannot appraise costs and benefits properly 
without economywide analysis1112
Second key: ‘due process’
 Independent agency to conduct review
 Interested parties to make submissions on public 
record
 Helps if initial discussion paper produced
 Helps if draft report for comment produced
 Recommendations injected formally into 
government decision making
 All to happen internally, not externally13
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Does ‘best practice’ transparency 
happen elsewhere?
 No
 Increasing use of first ingredient: economy-wide 
analysis
 But ‘due process’ is lacking
 Existing TPRM in WTO has neither of the two 
essential ingredients15
Summary
 Agricultural protection is a political problem
– To solve it requires changing the politics
 Underlying processes behind Doha negotiations 
now inadequate to change the politics sufficiently
– Reciprocity now no longer working
– Fuels the wrong ‘exports good, imports bad’ 
message
 Transparency as a process shown to work in 
Australia’s case
– Two ingredients: economy-wide and ‘due process’
 Transparency changes the politics of protection16
Forces for and against reform
Forces for reform Forces against reform
Farmers17
Price differentiation, domestic 




























































































Area of private forests